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THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION SECTION 
ON 
PERCE~ WRR 
Newsletter • Winter, 1995 
From the Editor: 
As you look through it, I'm sure 
you'll notice that this edition of the 
Section newsletter has a different 
mix of contributions. Instead of the 
usual collection of announcements, 
updates, and administrative tidbits, 
this edition is weighted by two main 
features. The first is an update on 
the Section's genocide task force (by 
Allen Grimshaw) and a response by 
Jack Nusan Porter. The second is a 
longer, substantive piece on 
organizational governance in peace 
movements by John Lofland and 
Joseph Fahey. Both of these 
features are longer, more 
substantive, and potentially more 
controversial than our usual 
content. Let me know your reactions 
to these pieces; feel free to write 
comments, responses, or original 
contributions on these or other 
topics. I welcome your suggestions, 
contributions, updates, and 
administrative tidbits. It's your 
newsletter. 
--Dana Eyre 
INTERIM REPORT FROM THE TASK 
FORCE ON GENOODE, POLITI ODE 
AND DEMOODE (GPD) 
By Allen Grimshaw 
In the time since publication of some 
earlier thought about such a task 
force in these pages (Spring/Summer, 
1994)--and since our discussions in 
Los Angeles--and in light of what I 
have learned about current and 
anticipated projects of other 
organizations, it has become clear that 
our Section's agenda for activity on 
GPD can and should be less ambitious 
than that I originally sketched as a 
possibility. An emergent 
interdisciplinary group, the Initiative 
on Preventing Genocide and Politicide 
(the Steering Committee of which 
includes three sociologists [H.elen 
Fein, William Gamson, and Charles 
Tilly)} will be undertaking such 
responsibilities as (1) facilitation of 
research, (2) generating programs of 
interdisciplinary cooperation and 
creating relationships with activist 
organizations, 
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(3) educating our own political leaders and those 
of other countries about what is going on and 
about what they can/should do, and (4) 
dissemination of information on GPO to the public 
at large. Thus, our Task Force and our Section can 
focus primarily on what can be done within our 
own departments and institutions (and other work 
settings) and on what we ourselves can learn and 
do. In what follows .l will: (1) 'say something about 
a way in which we can integrate the study of GPO 
in central concerns of sociology and thereby raise 
awareness and understanding of the phenomena, 
their consequences, and possible prevention and I 
or amelioration and (2) share information about a 
new organization devoted to study of genocide. 
2. The section has had little or no success in 
persuading sociologists to teach courses on 
genocide/politicide; there are still only a few place 
where such courses or courses on war more 
generally are regularly taught. When courses ARE 
taught it is often outside of sociology. There are 
still only a handful of social problems texts which 
include sections on war or GPO as social 
problems. While some colleagues incorporate GPO 
materials in courses seen as particularly relevant 
(race and ethnic relations or demography might be 
example), treatments of war and/ or GPO are 
essentially nonexistent in texts in other areas in 
sociology (or for that matter in other social 
sciences). 
In sociology, alone (as a starter). the following 
"areas of interest" from among which ASA 
members are asked to select four, could (in some 
cases should) address GPO issues (and probably 
also issues of war and peace more generally). 
biosociology; 
collective behavior /social movements; 
community; 
comparative sociology I macrosociology; 
demography; 
development; 
economy and society; 
environmental sociology; 
human ecology; 











sociology of emotions; 
sociology of language/sociallinguistics; 
sociology of mental health; 
sociology of world conflict (!); 
stratification/ mobility; 
theory 
Most readers will have other areas they feel should 
be included in this list. Methodologists, for 
example, might integrate examples from GPO into 
their courses. While the list of areas of interest is 
not isomorphic with that of ASA sections, the 
sections might be a good place to start. 
I seek volunteers (initially from our own Section on 
Peace and War but also, as necessary and 
appropriate, from elsewhere in sociology or 
cognate disciplines) who will work with colleagues 
in other sections and/or areas of interest to 
prepare units" on GPO (and, hopefully, on other 
war and peace concerns). Such units would include 
some introductory material on the general nature 
of GPO and on its sociological relevance and 
would continue with some sort of outline of topics 
specific top the section or area of interest. A unit 
on socialization, for example, would examine the 
consequences for children of the post traumatic 
stress disorder associated with extensive living in 
circumstances of GPO or other continuing violent 
conflict whether in Kampuchea or Mozambique or 
the West Bank or inner city Chicago (see, e.g., 
Garabino, Kostelny, and Dubrow, 1991). Related 
and quite different resources could be employed in 
units in courses on education, family mental 
health--to mention only some more obvious 
examples. 
It seems obvious to me that units on GPO should 
be included in courses on biosociology, 
demography, human ecology, medical sociology, 
and social change;. what is obvious to me is clearly 
NOT obvious to others. Introductory 
demography / population texts often contain 
material on war and/or genocide; I have no 
knowledge of how foregrounded the material is in 
actual courses. 
Our section members have a range of interests 
across most, if not all, of the spectrum; there are 
probably co-memberships with almost all ASA 
sections. Please contact me if you are interested in 
participating in this project. I will undertake at 
least some initial coordination. If response 
warrants, I will propose that a representative of the 
Section on Peace and War will officially approach 
Chairs of all (possibly) relevant ASA Sections and 
invite them to nominate a representative of their 
section who would be interested in working with a 
member(s) of our section to develop materials and 
bibliography which can be made available to any 
interested parties so that they can incorporate 
information, documentation, bibliography, films, 
etc., at appropriate juncture in courses. If we are 
able to generate appropriate and useful materials 
some subset of participants can edit the materials 
in a format which can then be offered to the ASA 
teaching program for publication and 
dissemination. We would also undertake to 
facilitate distribution of already available 
resources such Freedman-Apse! and Fein, 
'Teaching about genocide," and Chalk's, 
"Introducing genocide into the university 
curriculum." 
Section members (or other interested readers) who 
would like to participate in this project should 
contact me directly at: Department of Sociology 
Indiana University, Bloomington IN 47405 
grimsha@indiana.edu (PLEASE NOTE: no "w") 
3. Helen Fein (46 Irving Street, Cambridge MA 
02138; TEL (617)354-2785; FAX (617)491-8076) 
announces the formation of the Association of 
Genocide Scholars. The Association will convene 
regularly to "advance analysis, prediction, and 
prevention" of genocide. She invites members of 
the Section to become members and/ or to 
participate in the group's first conference, 
scheduled for ]Wle 14-16, 1995, in Willamsburg, 
VA. For information, please contact Helen 
directly. It will make her life easier if you can send 
a stamped, self-addressed envelope if you use the 
US mail. 
4. I will be delighted to hear from any of you with 
suggestions, proposals, or whatever! PEACE! 
Allen D. Grimshaw 
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WHAT IS GENOCIDE? A Response to 
the Report of the ASA Task Force on 
Genocide, Politicide and Democide. 
by Jack Nus an Porter 
One thing is certain: we need more discussion 
and debate on these issues; discussion beyond this 
newsletter, but here are my immediate responses 
to the report. I should state a few of my biases. I 
am a sociologist, but also a child of Holocaust 
survivors -- my parents were active in the Soviet 
Army; my father was a Soviet military commander 
in the partisans of Western Ukraine. 
I argue that genocide studies should 
concentrate on the Holocaust, with politicide, 
democide, and nuclear omnicide as secondary 
issues. The Holocaust (of the Jews in Europe from 
1933-1945) is unique in history, in its bureaucratic 
and technological scope. There have been mass 
murders (native Americans, blacks in the Middle 
Passage) that have far exceeded the Holocaust in 
sheer numbers, but none before nor since have 
duplicated its ferocity, lethality, and sophistication. 
The Holocaust was the culmination of some of 
the most significant political, moral, religious,.and 
demographic tendencies of Western Civilization in 
the 20th Century (see Richard Rubenstein, I!:le_ 
Cuooing of History). I do not believe that we will 
ever see another holocaust like "the Holocaust". 
Sociologists are uncomfortable with unique events. 
Of course, all historical events are unique, but the 
Holocaust was a "tremendum", one of the defining 
events of our civilization. Hiroshima was also 
unique. But because something is unique does not 
mean that it can not be compared to other 
genocides and understood in generalized terms. I 
do not take a strict exclusivist view of the 
Holocaust, tmlike Steven Katz, director of-the 
Holocaust museum in Washington, D.C .. Katz 
feels that the only real genocide was the Holocaust 
because it was the only state-sponsored genocide 
that had as its intent the destruction of an entire 
group of people. In all other genocides there was 
never an intent to kill ~ single member of the 
targeted population. This is a provocative 
statement and Katz backs it up in his three volume 
The Holocaust in Historical Context. However, 
one can disagree with this position and still argue 
there is a problem of Holocaust denial and 
definitional abuse in our use ohhe term genocide. 
Misapplying the term genocide ils very common in 
sociology. To make everything genocide is to 
make nothing genocide. Massacres, "oppression", 
"atrocities", nuclear attack, Dresden, Hiroshima, 
My Lai, Maalot, slavery, abortion, th~ treatement of 
women and witches, the "suppression" of 
American Indians are not genocide. 
To overlook the u.riiqueness of the Holocaust 
is a subtle form of Holocaust denial. To see the 
Holocaust as just another genocide is to deny its 
profound ability to be used as the key case study of 
our era, of universal comparability to other 
genocides. This is not to gainsay or to under-
estimate other genocides. I do not believe in 
"comparative suffering". Just because something is 
not a "genocide" does not mean it is not a heinous 
act. Our language should reflect this. (See my 
Genocide and Human Rights: A Global Anthology 
for further discussion.) 
If access to material is facilitated, I believe we 
can persuade sociologists to teach courses in the 
sociology of genocide or to use GPO units other 
courses. I have developed a curriculum guide ~ 
Sociology of Genocide and The Holocaust 
available from the ASA) which addresses questions 
of uniqueness and universality, and includes 
material on several genocides. 
I would not like to see Genocide Studies 
marginalized, but if we can not find a home in the 
Peace and War Section then we may have to 
develop a separate section on Genocide and 
Holocaust Studies. 
We must not lock ourselves into rigid 
"Stalinistic" frameworks and definitions. There 
must be respect for a multi-paradigmatic approach. 
Mine could be called the "uniqueness-
comparability" approach that sees the Holocaust as 
unique yet comparable to others. Other scholars 
may have a more "inclusivist" or "exclusivist" 
approach. Some will label events genocide where 
others would not. Some will attempt to expand the 
boundaries of the field by inventing new concepts 
such as "politicide" , "democide", or nuclear 
omnicide. So be it. Let a hundred flowers (and 
typologies) bloom. Let us at least respect our 
differences and learn from them by listening to 
each other. Human beings are finding more 
creative ways to kill each other every day. 
I can be contacted at (617) 965-8388, or at The 
Spencer Group,8 Burnside Road, Newton 
Highlands, MA 02161. I welcome your responses. 
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DECISION MAKING IN PEACE 
GROUPS 
by John Lofland 
and Joseph J. Fahey 
Members of America peace groups espouse 
democratic values and practices, but many peace 
organizations are also often oligarchical and 
undemocratic. We are puzzled by this 
inconsistency between profession and practices 
and we seek here to develop an understanding of 
this paradox. Before embarking, we need to 
address the possible objection that concepts of 
governance are not relevant to discussion of 
peace groups. Members of peace groups, one 
might argue, make no claims about democracy in 
general or with regard to their groups in 
particular. Therefore, there is no paradox or 
contradiction to explain. We do not disagree 
with the argument that peace groups are much 
like other groups. We do think, though that any 
group that takes unto itself the appellation of 
peace is involved in a set of expe~tations and 
standards that are rather different -- and higher 
-- than a great many other groups. 
Peace groups are quite different associations 
in several ways. First and statistically, they are 
a tiny minority of all American group. Second, 
members of these groups view themselves as a 
distinctive minority, as standing against the 
prevailing and mainstream orthodoxies of power. 
Third, these members see themselves as in one 
or another way speaking truth to power and 
calling the nation to higher moral standard. 
Fourth, while the specific politics and policies 
they advocate vary enormously, they espouse a 
distinctive set of values. Charles DeBenedetti 
captures the values of what he ·calls the peace 
subculture: 
The peace subculture speaks of forbearance 
within a culture that has flowered on conquest. 
It speaks of reconciliation within a society that 
works better at distributing weapons that wealth. 
It speaks of supranational authority among 
a ... nationalist people who dislike all authority. It 
speaks of just global order to governing officials 
anxious for preeminence and profit. 
While De Benedetti does not mention 
democracy in this passage or in the larger 
analysis from which we quote, we think that 
democracy is clearly entailed in the values that 
are expressed. Oligarchy in peace groups is 
therefore a puzzle and paradox that properly 
elicits inquiry. 
OLIGARCHY AND DEMOCRACY 
In ordinary discourse, the term oligarchy 
means government in the hands of a few or 
government in which the power is confined to a 
few persons. A number of.varying or additional 
features are sometimes also adduced. First, a 
distinction is sometimes drawn between legal 
oligarchy where concentration of power is 
supported by law, and natural or de.facio 
oligarchy, where respect and prestige give a 
relatively few people the right to rule. Second, 
some depiction's of oligarchy distinguish among 
whose interests are served by oligarchic 
arrangements. Aristotle is thus reported to have 
classified governments in terms of the two 
variables of "the number of persons who ruled 
and the purposes served by their rule." 
Oligarchy was present when a few persons ruled 
for their own !:1atisfaction (Jenken, 1968:281) 
This conception, that is, distinguishes between a 
public interest -- or at least the interests of 
multiple groupings in a polity -- and only the 
interests of the few who are ruling. Third, in 
some depictions, the narrowness of serving such 
interests is also thought to be irresponsible or 
corrupt. In this meaning, government by the few 
is expanded to mean government by an 
irresponsible and corrupt few who are 
irresponsible and corrupt because they are 
serving only their own interests (Jenkin, 
1986:283). 
It is important to distinguish oligarchy from 
several forms of political organization with 
which it might be confused. These are 
authoritarianism, autocracy, dictatorship, 
totalitarianism. Oligarchy is neutral in meaning 
as regards these other forms of regime. Most 
often, oligarchies are probably not also one these 
four. Each of these four imply rulers who are 
exercising high levels of zeal and comprehensive 
goals and plans for ruling a polity. In contrast, 
as a generic, the pattern of oligarchy can also be 
a quite mundane and limited affair carried on by 
laconic office-holders who have only the most 
modest of goals and plans for running a polity. 
So conceived, we can entertain the possibility 
of several types or patterns of oligarchy, each of 
which might have its own distinctive causes and 
consequences. Thus, with regard to peace 
groups, the patterns of oligarchy studied in the 
classic literature may not apply without 
modification to the oligarchy found in these 
groups. The organizational entities analyzed in 
the classic studies of Michels (1959) and Lipset et 
al., (1956) were quite large, financially 
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significant, and structurally complex. Only a 
handful of peace groups even remotely approach 
such scale of organization and significance. 
Instead, most are rather small, even rag-tag, 
affairs that are scraping by with only a dozen or 
so core members, if that. While the concept of 
oligarchy may be analytically justified in 
characterizing such small scale undertakings, 
the classic formulation of oligarchy also implies a 
scale that is simply not observed in peace groups. 
Perhaps, indeed, it might be more accurate to 
speak of such groups as simply clique dominated 
or central personality dominated. Since, 
however, there is a line of thought treating 
oligarchy but not treating clique-domination, we 
retain the concept of oligarchy as a frame for 
analyzing the structures of peace groups. We do 
so, though, with the understanding that we are 
here addressing oligarchy in more modest and 
fluid organizational entities. If we are prepared 
to envision the possibility of types of oligarchy 
this should pose no problem in conceptual 
development and empirical inquiry. 
We contrast the concept of democracy with 
that of oligarchy (or clique/central person 
domination). Unlike the rather stable history of 
meaning of oligarchy, democracy has undergone 
enormous verbal stretching and is a very loose 
label. Bearing that caution in mind, we start 
with the ordinary and abstract conception that 
democracy is government of, by, and for the 
people. This is abstract but not hopelessly so 
because even at this level democracy contrasts 
with oligarchy conceived as government of, by, 
?Dd for the few. Of what, more specifically, 
though does democracy consist? Thinking now 
only of what Sartori terms micro-democracy (i.e. 
small polities such a voluntary associations, 
including peace groups) and democracy that is 
representational rather direct, analysts have 
pointed to the following constituent features. 
1. Written, Enforced Constitution. 
2. Universal Suffrage. 
3. Equal Representation. 
4. Open and Fair Elections. 
5. Free Dissent . . 
6. Intermediate Structures. 
7. Open Information and Participation. 
8. Full and Sober Deliberation. 
9. Leaders Restrained and Monitored. 
10. Rotating Leaders. 
11. Polity-Wide Legitimate Leadership. 
12. Dispersed Power. 
These and other features of micro-democracy 
that might be listed all aim to avoid corrupt rule 
by the few through establishing organizational 
arrangements that: (1)allow diverse views to find 
organized settings for their expression: (2) 
permit diverse views to achieve proper hearings 
in electoral and other places of decision: (3) 
restrain the actions of people in positions in 
power. 
EXTENT & CHARACTER OF OLIGARCHY 
The empirical question we want to answer is: 
What is the degree to which one finds democracy 
versus oligarchy among American peace groups? 
The existing scholarly literature pertinent to 
answering this question divides into reports of 
two kinds, quantitative and qualitative. 
We h ave reviewed the literature in search of 
quantitative assessments of the organizational 
characteristics of peace groups, and have been 
struck by the fact that , despite an enormous and 
recent literature on the peace movement, almost 
none of it has been systematically quantitative 
even on the characteristics of participants, much 
less on the characteristics of their organizations. 
Happily, however, there has been at least 
one quantitative study of peace organizations per 
se. This was a mail survey designed and 
conducted by Mary Anna Colwell in 1988 
(Colwell, 1989). Using the Topsfield Foundation 
census of the 7, 700 American groups existing in 
1987, Colwell sent a questionnaire to each of the 
497 of these groups who reported annual budgets 
of$30,000 or more; 274 of them returned it, a 
57% response rate. She also drew a five percent 
sample of the 7,200 remaining groups (those 
with annual budgets under $30,000). Of the 330 
groups in this sample, 139 returned her 
ques tionnaire, a 47% response rate. Together, 
Colwell assembled questionnaires on 413 peace 
groups. 
Before examining responses a note of caution 
is required. The people who completed these 
questionnaires are not simply reporting their 
beliefs and attitudes. They are being asked to 
sum up certain kinds of objective social realities 
in their groups. Their responses are being 
treated as informant reports rather than as the 
subjective beliefs and perceptions of respondents. 
But we also know that any two people can well 
differ in their assessment of the exact character 
of objective social practices and arrangements. 
For this reason, multiple observers and tests of 
reliability are frequently employed in social 
research . No such checks were in operation h ere 
and we know little about how one rather than 
another person came to complete the 
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questionnaire in these groups. Therefore, we 
have to treat these data with considerable 
prudence. 
Peace group informants were asked: "We are 
interested in how peace groups operate. Please 
read the list of statements below. In the space to 
the right of each statement, please indicate if the 
statement is true or false for your group or 
organization by inserting the most appropriate 
number from the true/false scale." There follows 
a true-false scale using the numbers one through 
seven, wher e "1" is defmitely true and "7" is 
definitely false. Four of the 23 statements in the 
section on "operations" bear on questions of 
democracy and oligarchy and these are given in 
Figure 1. Colwell dichotomized the seven 
responses between two and three and treats 
points one and two as "true". She was also 
especially interested in how larger and smaller 
budget groups might answer the questions 
differently, as is also reported in Figure 1. We 
are not here interested in differences between 
large and small budget groups, but for the sake 
of accuracy our summary generalizations about 
these da ta need to incorporate the contrast 
where appropriate: 
- About half of larger groups a quarter of 
small ones have clearly defined structure. 
- Some ten percent of larger groups and 
thirty percent of smaller ones have no forma lly 
designated leaders. 
- A third of larger groups and a quarter of 
smaller groups select leaders by election. 
- A strong majority of all groups use 
"consensus processes" rather than majority rule 
in making decisions. 
Colwell's questionnaire also contained 
questions relating to the topic of "management 
and planning" and asked informants to indicate 
who participated in "deciding on the major 
program activities" and "who participates in 
developing the annual budget?" . Five options: 
Paid staff- Committee of the leadership-
General membership - Board of Directors - [and] 
Other -- were provided, each to be marked "no" 
or "yes." 
In publishing answers to these questions, 
Colwell continued her interest in how responses 
differ by size of budget and added, moreover, an 
interest in the effects of being a pacifist or a non 
pacifist organization. The effects of these two 
dichotomized variables have on the percentage of 
informants answering yes to the planning and 
budgeting participation questions are reproduced 
here in Figure 2. Again, our central interest is 
Figure 1: 
Extent of Oligarchic-Democratic Practicies As Reported by 
Informants in the Colwell Survey of American Peace Groups. 
Percent of informants responding "True" 
(at scale points 1 and 2 on a seven point 
"definitely true"(1) to "definitely false" (7) 
scale) bv size of budaet. 
Groups reporting Groups reporting 
Statements: 
annual budgets of annual budgets of 
$30,000 or more $30,000 or less 
1. "There is an agreed upon, clearly defined 
structure that includes rules, operating 55 28 
procedures and a known way for participants 
to hold each other accountable." 
2. "Our organization prefers to operate 11 30 
without formally designated leaders." 
3. "Our organization chooses leaders by an 
election process." 38 26 
4. "Most of the time we use consensus 
proceses and not majority rule to make 60 74 
important decisions." 
Figure 2: 
General Membership Participation in Planning and Budgeting as Reported by Informants 
in the Colwell Survey of American Peace Groups 
Percent of informants answering ''Yes", by size 
of budget and pacifist-nonpacifist beliefs. 
Groups reporting Groups reporting 
annual budgets of annual budgets of 
$30,000 or more $30.000 or less 
Questions: Pacifist Nonpacifist Pacifist Non pacifist 
1. General membership participates 
"in deciding on major program 44 59 44 24 
activities." 
2. General membership "participates 
in developming the annual budget." 36 26· 14 7 
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in peace groups as a generic class rather 
than in the variations. Despite variation, two 
overall generalizations are nonetheless quite 
clear: 
- the general membership participates in 
deciding on major activities in half or less of all 
peace groups. 
- the general membership is involved in 
devising an annual budget in perhaps a quarter, 
at best, of all peace groups. 
Based on informant answers to these 
questions, then, to what extent are American 
peace groups oligarchic versus democratic in the 
ways we have defmed these terms? If one uses 
election of leaders and member participation in 
developing organizational activities as indicator, 
we would have to say that on the order of less 
than half of group representatives claim their 
groups are democratic in these senses. If one 
adds majority voting as an indicator of 
democracy, a very substantial majority of peace 
groups are not democratic. Looked at from the 
other side -- that of oligarchy -- the low 
proportion of g'!Oups in which members are 
involved in budgeting and the substantial 
minority of groups without clear structure 
suggests widespread oligarchic practices. 
The most cautious and conservative 
summary estimate we can draw from these data 
is that no more than half of peace groups are 
democratic. Less cautiously and conservatively, 
one might conclude that a strong majority of 
these groups are significantly oligarchic. 
QUALITATIVE REPORTS 
While rather few in number, several 
descriptions relating to governance processes in 
American peace groups are available and these 
augment our understanding of both the extent 
and character of oligarchy. We find it helpful to 
organize discussion of these descriptions in 
terms of John Lofland's "organizational profile" 
of the peace movement. At one extreme are 
volunteer bureaucracies exemplified by such 
organizations as Beyond War, which were very 
hierarchically bureaucratic. At the other 
extreme are the quasi-commune formations of 
radical Christians whose lives were dedicated to 
communities of pacifist resistance and 
nonviolent acts of symbolic civil disobedience. 
Among such prophets, forms of charismatic 
leadership were the dominant tendency. 
Between these were several ambiguously 
democratic forms, including many "Mom and/or 
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Pop Shops" that were clearly dominated by a 
single figure and her or his circle of supporters. 
Most of the [organizational] forms in the middle 
of the spectrum Lofland describes were de facto 
undemocratic in the sense that their oligarchic 
features were merely unremarked on and 
unremarkable features of their functioning. 
One special variety of these was, however, 
explicitly and ideologically antidemo·cratic. We 
speak, of course, of the ideology of consensus 
process which was anti-democratic at least in the 
sense of being unsatisfied with majority voting 
and elected leaders. What movement people 
termed affinity groups were most committed to 
consensus process, but the idea of its 
appropriateness was much more widespread, as 
we see above in Figure 1, Statement 4. Lofland 
estimates that perhaps seven percent of peace 
groups were affinity groups and based on the 
Colwell survey we surmise that it was practiced 
with some frequency among the large category of 
(formally) democratic groups -- a category 
Lofland estimates to make up almost three-
quarters of associations. 
Because of relatively widespread use of at 
least weaker forms of consensus process, we 
think it is important to be specific regarding the 
sense in which this process was less than 
democratic and even oligarchic. Despite the 
enthusiasm with which one often found 
consensus embraced, a number of movement 
participants were critical of it to the point of 
published critiques. Among these, the 
reservations expressed by veteran peace activist 
Allen Smith and published in the War Resister's 
League's Nonviolent Activist are of particular 
note. In Smith's experience, "the implicit 
possibility of a block (a single person vetoing a 
group .decision) often enforces a false unanimity 
and causes a group to modify plans to prevent 
the possible block." In such a way, groups often 
avoid "healthy political conflict" (Smith, 
1991:13.14). In a pamphlet circulated in 
Northern California peace circles in the mid 
1980s, affinity group participant Howard Ryan 
echoes such yiews in reporting how decisions 
were "watered down" or "poor quality" because 
consensus process "works to discourage 
disagreement and raising controversial issues --
Voting. (in contrast) because it does not require 
complete unity, makes it easier for people to 
disagree." (Ryan, 1983). 
Consensus is sometimes justified as being 
"non-coercive", in contrast to democracy. But, 
say some people who have practiced it, the exact 
opposite is often actually the case because a 
single person is given the power to coerce the 
vast majority of a group through the threat of a 
block. And while "consensus advocates often 
speak of the importance of group trust, the 
consensus method actually has mistrust at its 
foundations-- (because) it assumes that if people 
are not given the power to block -- others in the 
group are not going to listen to them, that their 
needs will be ignored" (Ryan, 1983). In some 
forms of consensus process, leaders are also 
eschewed and replaced by a "facilitator." But, 
critics suggest, this abdication of formal, 
democratic leadership "merely (gives) more room 
for informal cliques and hidden leaders to 
dominate groups." And groups can become so 
meticulous that they create a "process elite." 
But what of the more common and garden 
variety peace group that flourished so broadly 
across the United States in the 1980s? 
Unfortunately, we have remarkably few 
descriptions of just how the groups made 
decisions -- a deficit likely a result of the fact 
that scholarly ethnographers are drawn more 
easily to exotic rather than to mundane groups. 
We do, though, have a few reports that suggest 
an at least overall picture even though it is not 
one focused with precision on questions of 
democracy and oligarchy. Loflan.d summarizes 
these reports as a picture of great differences in 
levels of involvement and of frequent vacillation, 
indecision and "buffeting" regarding courses of 
action. 
Andrea Ayvazian's report of her experience 
with these garden variety peace groups is of 
particular interest, for, it is based on "over one 
hundred days on the road conducting 
'organizational' development' workshops and 
meeting with activists in 44 states". She reports: 
"At meetings of groups I visit, it is perfectly 
clear to me who has been part of the group for 
more than two years and who has not. I know 
exactly who the new kids on the block are: they 
sit there and the nod and they get the worst 
jobs." 
Ironically, the founders or that original core 
group frequently are saying: 
"we want new blood (but) once new 
people get there -- the founders dlisempower 
them. The founders mostly talk to each other. 
They make plans with an interchange and a 
dynamic that leaves out new people -- There is 
often an in-group jargon and a sense ofwho has 
been there a long time. New people often feel 
they don't know how to plug in. 
Pertinent to the question of do peace groups 
formally profess democracy, Ayvazian observes 
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that "founders disease" is a "sharp irony" 
because "we talk about empowering in the world, 
empowering our community, empowering our 
congregations, Senators and everyone else -- but 
we disempower new people who come to our 
meetings -- As much as we do not want to create 
a sense of elitism or exclusiveness, we are 
«reating it". 
Although the quantitative and qualitative 
data show quite robust tendencies to oligarchy in 
Ainerican peace groups, we certainly do not want 
to say that this pattern is universal. At least a 
significant minority of American peace groups do 
practice democracy in the senses of the term we 
give in our discussion above. Among those for 
which we have documentation, we want 
specifically to point up Frank Folsom and Connie 
Fledderjohann's (1988) sensitive chronicle of the 
struggle for democratic functioning on The Great 
Peace March, the Lost Angeles to Washington 
trek of several hundred marchers in 1985. 
CAUSES OF OLIGARCHY 
We have reviewed quantitative and 
qualitative materials suggesting rather 
widespread oligarchical tendencies among 
American peace groups. We want now to ask: 
What factors might be involved in fostering and 
sustaining such oligarchic tendencies? We 
discuss possible causes in three areas: 
structural, ideological, and social pyschological. 
Structural: Mayhaw and Levinger (1976) 
have persuasively argued that the information 
processing limits of humans combined with the 
need for unified action by groups tend to create 
oligarchic patterns even among human 
associations that are quite small. Further, · 
human associations operating in "turbulent" 
environments need to act rapidly and in unity 
and are therefore especially prone to develop 
oligarchic elites. Since most human associates 
operate in turbulent rather than munificent 
environments and require rapid and unitary 
action, oligarchy of one or another pattern is the 
common consequence. Only the most 
uncommonly situated associations can survive 
the delay and disunity of action that is part and 
parcel of democracy. 
The need for rapid and unitary action in a 
constantly turbulent environment combines 
with a large number of additional features found 
especially in large-scaJ.e social organizations. 
Drawing from Michels, Lipset et al.,., set these 
forth as inclu<;ling bureaucratic structure per se, 
"control over the formal means of 
communication," incumbent "monopoly of 
political skills," existing leaders' desires to stay 
in office, and member apathy. 
Peace groups are subject to many if not most 
of these pressures and structural tendencies. 
Therefore, peace groups tend to be oligarchical 
for the same structural reasons as are other 
groups. 
Ideological: As previously mentioned, 
oligarchy is not a mystery among associations 
that profess it. They simply practice what they 
preach. As put by Lipset et al.,., "oligarchy 
becomes a problem only in organizations which 
assume as part of their public value system the 
absence of oligarchy, that is, democracy". 
In discovering inconsistency between 
profession and practice regarding democracy, 
previous analyses of this discontinuity have 
tended then to move to the structural level in 
seeking explanations of it. We do not at all 
discount structural factors such as those just 
outlined, but we do think it is important 
additionally to know how the involved actors are 
"defming the situation" in ways that renders 
oligarchy acceptable even as they profess 
democracy. Thus, for example, are oligarchic 
leaders, in Orwellian "Slavery is Freedom" style, 
claiming that "0 ligarchy is Democracy?" Or, do 
they not think about it at all and therefore have 
no account of the discrepancy? Or, are they 
focusing on other matters altogether? 
In our involvement's with peace groups we 
have encountered two major modes of obviating 
the presence of oligarchy in ostensibly 
democratic groups. The first of these might be 
"oligarchy obviousness," a lack of consciousness 
of or opposition to the pattern." They are part of 
the unnoticed and unremarked on, background 
of ordinary life. 
Related to this, we think it is especially 
telling that the presence of oligarchy has not 
been a major theme in either quantitative or 
qualitative scholarly reports of peace groups, or 
in activist's reflections on their experiences in 
peace groups. Regarding scholarly reports, we 
take note that although a substantial number of 
people have been involved in analyzing the 
Colwell data -- and a team even redid the 
original 1988 survey in 1991 -- in a period of 
some five years it never occurred to anyone to 
analyze items in the questionnaire relating to 
the topics. Regarding activists' reflections, the 
qualitative materials we review above do touch 
on oligarchy and democracy, but there are rather 
small in number. We notice, in contrast, that · 
the major activist-composed books on the 
upsurge of the peace movement in the 1980s 
pretty much ignore issues of democracy per se, 
although they do make at least glancing 
reference to personal and political struggles 
within and among groups. 
We want to underscore the especially 
puzzling character of such obliviousness. The 
substantive content of peace teachings places 
great stress on the importance of democracy in 
the society at large. A key -- even central --
theme of peace beliefs is that foreign, defense, 
and other government policies are controlled by 
a small "military-industrial" elite and this is a 
bad thing. For whatever reasons, these beliefs 
about the importance of democracy in the society 
at large were rarely perceived as relevant to the 
micro-organizational level of peace groups of 
which one was a member. It is yet another 
instance in which the thesis that people forge 
cognitive consistency in their lives is true only 
under very limited circumstances. 
The second mode of obviating the presence of 
oligarchy goes beyond obviousness with a 
positive vision of the group's mission that makes 
oligarchy seem proper and not simply invisible. 
We term one major version of this second mode 
of obviation "the missionizing model." For 
oligarchs in such peace associations, the primary 
group aim is to advance peace aims as an 
activity and form of thought. In one peace group 
of our acquaintance, this mission was spoken of 
by one leading oligarchic as a "crusading 
organization" that needed to have at least one 
person "on duty twenty-four hours a day." 
Members of the governing board of this 
association were the agents of this purpose. The 
oligarchs in this group assumed that everyone 
accepted this model -- or should accept it. New 
members who did not accept it were told that 
they should resign. If they did not, that they 
were subversive. It was even suggested by some 
that those in disagreement with the "crusading" 
model or with other views of the founding 
oligarchs may be FBI informants sent to disrupt 
the organization. 
In some groups we also observe a second and 
much stronger variation on obviating oligarchy 
with a positive vision, a variation we can term 
the "peace bund" or comradeship. Such oligarchs 
regard their participation as -- in the words of 
one -- "intensely personal." The person 
expressing this view thought of himself as a 
highly moral -- as a person who stood 
forthrightly against the violence and war of the 
modern world. He could therefore declare that 
his kind of people sought to "live authentic lives" 
and the organization was vehicle by means of 
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which "we model in our {organization} the kinds 
of persons we would like to be." In this instance 
of a peace bund, the staff person was viewed as a 
selfless and self-sacrificing leader who make no · 
important mistakes and who gave all he had for 
the organization for but meager financial return. 
Such sentiments expressed a thorough consensus 
among the oligarchs regarding goals, tasks, and 
responsibilities and, as such, the notions of 
oligarchy and democracy were irrelevant. 
We find it helpful to think ofthe "peace 
bund" as a stronger and more emotionally 
invested form of what Andrea Ayvazian has 
-terms "Founders' Disease": the tendency of 
founding organizers of a group to exhibit a 
comfortable, in-group consensus that resists 
open and democratic forms of organization. 
While peace bunds certainly do these and other 
things Ayvazian describes, they are 
distinguished by a stronger degrees of 
rationalization in lofty moral terms and claims of 
superior moral vision. Combined with believing 
that one of their number is a "leader" of 
exceptional capabilities and accomplishments, 
the deepest of commitment and self-sacrifice, 
peace bunds thus tend to be embryonic versions 
of what sociologist terms "cults" or "sects". 
Social-Psychological: In addition to 
structural and ideological causes, we think there 
are some social psychological factors that need to 
be taken into account. Three such factors have 
impressed us as especially meriting scrutiny. 
Oligarchy obliviousness is likely related to 
another theme that is striking in the social 
psychology of peace group people. While they 
are critical of the organization and behavior of 
remote social institutions, closer to home and in 
their personal files, we observe pronounced 
reluctance openly to be critical of others' actions. 
The quintessential expression of this was the 
popularity of the idea (if not the practice) of what 
was called "consensus decision-making". 
Fundamental to this commitment was the belief 
that there was a truth on which we could all 
eventually agree if we only worked hard enough 
to find it. The alternative view is, of course, that 
there are real, irresolvable and rational 
disagreements on a great many things that 
prevent complete consensus. In this other view, 
we must face up to this fact and devise means for 
collective decision-making and action that 
accepts the existence of unavoidable and 
unresolvable conflict. Hence, there is a need for 
majority vote or some other non-consensus 
formula. The passion for consensus, on the other 
hand bespeaks a conflict-averse mindset or even 
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a passive/aggressive orientation to conflict 
resolution. 
One implication is that even before matters 
of actual decision-making, conflict adverse peace 
group people are disposed not to "see" matters in 
their immediate environments that might be 
topics of dispute and disputation. Instead, they 
are disposed "see" opportunities for solidarity 
and celebration of how "we are all together" in 
some social undertaking. Therefore, even the 
most undemocratic practices are selectively 
disattended --which is "oligarchy obviousness." 
We need further to recognize that the 
ordinary environments in which most members 
of peace groups live out the bulk of their lives are 
themselves quite hierarchical and formally and 
'legitimately' oligarchic. Indeed, subordination 
and lack of democracy are dominant experiences 
of the round oflife ofvirtually every citizen, 
members of peace groups or not. Therefore, to 
expect people who are routinely subordinated 
suddenly to question oligarchy in a particular 
group is to expect the unlikely. 
Our discussion of ingrained subordination 
versus democratic involvement treats the broad 
matter of long-term life experience. Separate 
from this, however, is variation in how much one 
has simply read or heard about democratic group 
functioning in peace groups . One can know 
about democratic groups without having any 
personal experience with them. On this 
dimension, too, we were impressed with the 
degree to which this was blank spot in the 
cognitive maps of peace groups people. 
We are struck, moreover, with the degree to 
which simple incompetence and ineptitude ought 
not be overlooked in understanding patterns of 
oligarchy (or a wide variety of other patterns of 
behavior and organization). While the story of 
"The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight" is 
fictional humor, that story nonetheless contains 
a core of truth that we dare not ignore. Affairs of 
an association can drift into a functionally 
oligarchic mess as a consequence of simply 
disorganized and ineffective efforts to cope 
among those in positions of responsibility. 
Failure to make information available, 
autocratic decisions, lack of action, and other 
practices that are organizationally oligarchic can 
arise from sheer disarray and not only from 
oligarchic motivation and clique domination. 
CONCLUSION 
We have sought, first and by means of a 
review of the literature and a case study, to 
determine the extent and character of oligarchy 
in American peace groups. We conclude that 
oligarchy is quite common and that it is, 
moreover, also not commonly defined as a 
problem. Second, we have explored a number of 
possible causes of oligarchy, drawing on the 
traditional literature relating to social structure 
and seeking further to expand our 
understanding by probing ideological and social 
psychological factors. We conclude that in 
addition to structural causes, the special ways in 
which peace group members define the 
oligarchies in which they are involved contribute 
to the genesis and maintenance of oligarchy. 
Although we have highlighted the presence, 
acceptance, and causes of oligarchy, we want to 
conclude by stressing the fact that while 
oligarchical trends are strong, they are far from 
having carried the day or having completely 
dominated all peace groups. In addition to the 
quantitative data from the Colwell survey which 
shows a strong -- but minority -- democratic 
pattern, we have also shown that there is a small 
but pointed body of pro-democratic and critical 
literature and action. 
This particularly the case when we place 
peace movement groups in comparative social 
movement perspective. For, taking all social 
movements organizations as a larger set, such 
organizations have not been and are not 
conspicuously democratic-- and a large portion 
of them are even vociferously anti-democratic in 
a way that makes even" consensus process" seem 
idyllically democratic by comparison. And very 
much like recent scholars of peace groups, 
scholars of other social movement organizations 
have not shown much sensitively to issues of 
oligarchy and democracy. We must therefore be 
careful not to single out peace groups and their 
analysts as any softer on oligarchy than 
participants in and analysts of movement 
organizations more generally. 
Our premise, however, in composing this 
analysis is that democratic peace groups are 
preferable to those that are oligarchic or clique 
dominated. It follows from this premise that we 
are interested in means by which democracy can 
be fostered among peace groups. We want 
therefore to conclude with suggestions regarding 
how this can be done and to utilize what we have 
said above in formulating these suggestions. 
There are many ways to foster social change, 
three of which are to offer intellectual analysis, 
to undertake educational campaigns, and to 
engage in political action. This report is an 
instance of the first of these three ways to seek 
change. By means of carefully bringing to the 
lore the historic concern with oligarchy in citizen 
groups and showing its pertinence to peace 
groups, we hope that the present effort can, in 
itself, play some role in the quest for change. 
And, we hope there will yet other scholarly 
analyses of this topic, the better to document and 
elaborate exact features of oligarchic patterns, 
differences in their causes and variations in their 
consequences. But, scholarly analyses are far 
from sufficient. 
Educational efforts, the second mode of 
seeking change, are additionally necessary. 
Such efforts can include more explicit attention 
to democratic practices in the numerous 
organizing manuals published for the use of 
peace groups. Indeed, these "social change 
manuals" tend either to say little about decision 
making or to endorse consensus process. One 
easy step toward would be for authors of these 
manuals at least to raise the issue of consensus 
process versus democratic forms of deliberation, 
as well as other facets organization. 
They might, in particular, use a Gandhian 
perspective in paying more attention to the 
means (now primarily consensus) which 
organizations use to achieve their goals. In a 
Gandhian perspective, the end or goal must ever 
be implicit in the means used to achieve that 
goal. Hence, if democracy is the desired end, 
then it must explicitly be found in the decision 
making process of a given group and, for the 
reasons stated above, we strongly question the 
democratic nature of consensus as a decision 
making process. 
Third and last, and recalling the famous 
peace slogan "knowing is not enoug,h/act for 
peace and justice." Informed peace people need 
to become agents of democratic change in their 
own groups. Part of this task is educational, but 
it also political, meaning that concrete proposals 
for change must be formulated, proposed and 
debated. Fears of change need to be overcome, 
an exceedingly delicate task in itself. Because of 
the various factors we have described above, 
democratic reform is not easy and a great deal of 
good humored persistence and patience is 
required to achieve it. So much such persistence 
and patience is needed, indeed, that one 
wonders if the supply of it is sufficient to the 
task. But that is a question for another inquiry. 
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1995 Distinguished Career 
Award 
At its business meeting in Los Angeles, the 
Peace and War Section presented! an inscribed 
pewter tray, symbol of its 1994 award for a 
distinguished career of scholarship, teaching and 
professional service, to Elise Boulding, Professor 
Emerita of Dartmouth College. 
Professor Boulding played a central role in 
founding and nurturing the Peace and War 
Section and many other organizational vehicles 
for the policy-relevant study of peace building 
and war prevention, e.g., the Consortium on 
Peace Research, Education,and Development 
(COPRED) and the International Peace Research 
Association (IPRA). She has worked 
internationally as a scholar and activist. 
The intellectual breadth of her research and 
commentary, appearing in over 150 publications, 
has enriched understanding of the contribution 
of socialization, women, images of the future, 
and international nongovernmental 
organizations to creating an environment of 
peace. A revised edition of her book on change in 
women's roles over four millennia, ~ 
Underside of Histocy, was republished in 1992. 
Recent works, Building an Global Civic Culture 
and Building Peace in the Middle East, focus on 
transnational voluntary associations: 
Boulding's educative influence has extended 
well beyond the U.S. and academic settings. Her 
capacity to listen, her ability to develop close 
relationships with people all over the world, 
here confidence that what she and others do can 
have significant and helpful effects, and her faith 
that attention to research and theory can serve 
moral purposes have inspired both scholarly 
production and citizen action. 
Newsletters: 
The newsletter Nonviolent Sanctions is 
available by request from the Albert Einstein 
Institution, 50 Church Street, Cambridge, MA 
02138. Donations are accepted. 
Elise Boulding Student Award - 1994 
The winner of the Section's 1994 Elise M. 
Boulding Student Paper Award is Tracy X. 
Kamer, who has just completed here Ph.D. in 
sociology at the University of Kansas 
(Lawrence). Her paper, "Fathers, Sons, and 
Vietnam: Masculinity and Betrayal in the Life 
Narratives ofVietnam Veterans with Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder" is from he1 
dissertation. Using data from extensive 
interviews with Vietnam combat veterans and 
participant observation on a PTSD unit of a 
Veterans Administration hospital, Karner 
explores idealized social and actual father 
models and images in the veterans life 
narratives. She shows how following the 
outdated models of masculinity of their fathers 
denied the sons the attainment of male 
adulthood and left them suspended in a 
marginalized social position. Honorable mention 
goes to "The Impact of Family Supportive 
Policies and Practices on Organizational 
Commitment." The author is Mary Christina 
Bourg who has just completed her M.A. in 
Sociology at the University of Maryland at 
College Park and is now teaching in the 
· Department of Behavioral Sciences and 
Leadership at West Point. She presented her 
paper, which is from her Master's thesis, at the 
Military Sociology session at the AS.A. meeting 
Members of the committed were James Hannon, 
Greg McLauchlan, David Rier (last year's Award 
winner) and Mady Wechsler Segal (chair. 
Request for nominations: Elise 
Boulding Student Award - 1995 
The Section announces the 1994-95 Elise 
Boulding Award for Distinguished Student 
Papers. The contest, whose name honors Elise 
Boulding and her many contributions to the 
study of peace, invites graduate and 
undergraduate students to submit papers on any 
topic within the realm of the sociology of peace 
and war. 
The papers are judged by a panel of scholars 
from the Section. The winner receives $200 
toward the cost of travel to the ASA Annual 
Meeting, or to help defray costs incurred while 
writing the paper. The winner also gets the 
opportunity to present her/his paper (in the 
usual format) at the Peace and War Section 
Roundtable at the 1995 Annual Meeting in 
Washington, D.C .. Formal presentation of the 
award occurs during the business meeting of the 
P~ace and War Section during the meetings. 
Papers submitted for the Award must have 
been written within the past two years. The 
must be typed, double spaced, 25 pages or less, 
and should adhere to standard academic format 
guidelines. Submit four copies of the paper by 
April15 to Tom Mayer, Department of Sociology, 
University of Colorado, Campus Box 327, 
Boulder, Colorado·, "80309. 
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Conferences: 
The Peace Studies Association, seventh 
annual meeting, will be held March 9-12 at Tufts 
University in Medford, MA. The theme will be 
Peace As A strategy: Practice, Movement, 
Culture. Contact Mathew Johnson Peace and 
Justice Studies, 109 Eaton Hall ~fts 
University, Medford, MA 02155' for information. 
The 1995 Social Sciences History Association 
annual meetings will be held 16-19 November in 
Chicago Il. Contact the Social Science Histo~ 
Association, Institute for Social Research, Box 
1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248 
Newly Published: 
American Peace Movement Organizations: 
The 1988 and 1992 Surveys. Mary Anna C. 
Colwell and Doug Bond. Institute for Nonprofit 
Management, University of San Francisco, 1994. 
From the Chair: 
ASA Meetings August 19-23, 1995. I am 
afraid deadlines for all but roundtable 
submissions will have passed by the time this 
Newsletter reaches you. Of the two sessions we 
have been allocated, the one on "Ethnic 
Religious, and Political Factors in Civil,Strife" is 
being organized by Martin Patchen of Purdue 
University; and the other, on "Peace and War in 
a Changing World" by Gregory McLauchlan of · 
the University of"Oregon. Papers and proposals 
for papers that, for one reason or another, cannot 
be accommodated within either of these sessions 
will automatically be considered for a 
roundtable. 
There has been complete, though not exactly 
golden, silence to my memo, E-mail, phone call, 
and faxes to the ASA and to Amitai Etzioni 
p~~sonally, requesting a thematic session with 
government officials and activists involved in 
peacekeeping. The project is obviously moot. On 
the other hand, I am in the process of arranging 
for a group visit for 50 persons to the US 
Memorial Holocaust Museum for Saturday, 
August 19, at 10 a.m., early enough to 
(hopefully) sidestep the mobs that will show up 
throughout the day. Those interested should let 
me know (Lang@max.u.washington.edu) so I can 
decide whether I should try to reserve places for 
members of peace and war or open the tour to all 
ASA members. 
Nominations. The slate for the 1995 election 
of section officers will be prepared over the next 
six weeks. Members are invited to make 
suggestions to the chair of the nominations 
committee: John MacDougall, 15 Old Lowell Rd., 
Westford, MA 01886. 
Newsletter. To make the Newsletter more 
attractive and increase its relevance to all 
members of the section, it would be desirable to 
have the editorial task shared by an associate 
editor to work in tandem with Dana Eyre and 
after he tires of it, take over as editor. · ' 
Instituting such an arrangement allows us not 
only to share responsibility but also to ease the 
transition from one editor to the next. 
Other plans. It may be late but all of us owe 
a gratitude to the preceding chair and officers of 
the section for ending the year with a conference 
to best all expectations. Its a hard act to follow 
and I think we should wait until someone has 
truly exciting idea to make the time spent in 
planning pay off. But let us not lose the 
momentum and at least begin to think about 
other productive themes for future conferences. 
Council will be highly receptive to ideas. 
I also urge most strongly that we follow 
through on the suggestion, made at the last 
business meeting, that members participate in 
and ~ai~tain liaison with the Foreign Studies 
Assoc1at10n, the Peace Research Association, and 
others that share many of our interests and 
aims. Reports of outstanding papers at their 
meetings in the Newsletter would be useful. 
Section awards. Nor let us forget our two 
sections awards, announcements of which will by 
now have appeared in FOOTNOTES. I have not 
yet been back long enough from my Fulbright in 
East Germany to have checked. Meanwhile, the 
award committee for the Oistinguished 
Scholarship, Teaching or Service award of the 
Peace and War Section seeks nominations from 
members for the award, to be made the 1995 
ASA Annual Meeting. The Award is intended to 
honor a career of substantial achievement in 
scholarship, service, teaching, or any 
combination of the three in the area of peace, 
war, or other aspects of violent group conflict. 
Ple~se send nomination letters summarizing 
ach1~vements and, if possible, a vita of the 
nommee to Kurt Lang, Department of Sociology 
DK-40, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 
98195. Deadline is May 1, 1995. 
-Kurt Lang 
CONTRIBUTE to your section newsletter-
preferably by email ! DEyre@nps.navy.mil 
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